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Book Reviews
Technology and War
Army of None: Autonomous Weapons and the Future of War
By Paul Scharre
Reviewed by Robert J. Bunker, adjunct research professor, Strategic Studies
Institute, US Army War College

A

rmy of None represents a ten-year intellectual effort that draws upon
Paul Scharre’s deep subject matter expertise related to autonomous
weapons systems and the concurrent ethical and policy considerations
that come with their development, fielding, and use. Scharre—a former
US Army Ranger with multiple tours in Iraq and Afghanistan and the
Office of the Secretary of Defense working group leader for Department
of Defense Directive 3000.09, Autonomy in Weapon Systems, November 21,
2012—is a senior fellow and director, Technology and National Security,
Center for a New American Security.
Scharre accedes to technological determinism and military
pragmatism; he recognizes autonomous systems and artificial
intelligence (AI) have gradually emerged in the arsenals of the world’s
great powers and will proliferate over time into those of lesser political
entities and even the more bellicose nonstate actors. The work focuses
on this military evolutionary process and the many issues surrounding
it. Just as AIs could conceivably engage in sociopathic behaviors for
end-state fulfillment, it could be said that Army of None also possesses
its own inherent contradictions that, at times, provide us with a sense of
an analytic amorality (238). This is because the author is attempting to
balance military necessity—the United States must gain dominance in
these new systems—while simultaneously promoting liberal democratic
and basic human values.
The book is divided into six parts with the following thematic
foci—part 1, “Robopocalypse Now”; part 2, “Building the Terminator”;
part 3, “Runaway Gun”; part 4, “Flash War”; part 5, “The Fight to Ban
Autonomous Weapons”; and part 6, “Averting Armageddon: The Weapon
of Policy.” Within each of these parts of the book, three to five chapters
are clustered together to develop a thematic focus of the twenty-one
book chapters. The book also contains an introduction, robust notes (tied
to sentence fragment quote strings), acknowledgements, abbreviations,
an index, 31 black and white photos, and various tables, figures, and
diagrams. However, no formal reference listing exists for the reader to
do follow-on topical reading. Scharre’s institutional knowledge of the
subject matter and “topical access” derived from numerous Department
of Defense and related organizational personage interviews—with
policymakers and officials, scientists and weaponeers, and philosophers
and ethicists—provide context and additional insider accuracy to his
writing and analysis.
The work logically progresses from one part to the next. For those
new to AI, a host of new concepts and terminology are provided such
as that of “perverse instantiation,” “ethical governor,” and “centaur
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warfighters” (239, 281, 322). An interweaving of real world military
history, operations, and technology with science fiction works and
movies makes for a lively juxtaposition of the real and the imagined.
An interesting component of this detailed book is that glimpses of
countermeasures to armed AI robots appear within it. These include
“hidden exploits”—deep neural nets perceiving image patterns that
humans don’t, which allow AI to be manipulated and attempt to trick
AI into misunderstanding human intent by mimicking conditions such
as hors de combat or surrender behavior (183–88, 258–60). Additionally,
the preconditions have been laid within the work to look deeper into
human, centaur (human/AI), and AI ground force combinations and
their pros and cons for future combat scenarios. A continuum of military
tradeoffs exists with speed, complexity, and morality representing some
of the dominant factors. While humans in and on the loop are always
preferred, the demands of some future engagements will quickly surpass
human cognitive loads that will likely take us into Faustian dilemmas
related to the costs of victory and how it was achieved.
Coming from a professional military and defense analyst perspective,
criticisms of the work are relatively muted as it is well researched and
written. Arms control advocates of the “Stop Killer Robots” variety,
however, see this subject matter very differently and are aghast that
Scharre and others like him who represent great power interests have
moved beyond the debate and are accepting these systems as a fait
accompli. Still, it must be remembered that relying too much on AI
in the future—especially that of the more artificial general intelligence
variety—is reminiscent of World War I-like mobilization protocols, which
once tripped, were out of human ability to stop (231–33). Additionally,
Terminator and Skynet archetypes, which draw upon historical lessons
related to armed slaves turning on their masters, will also always haunt
us vis-à-vis armed autonomous systems.
Even with such concerns, this is a superb and accessible book actually
deserving of the media hype surrounding it. It is set at an affordable price
(and even more so when the cheaper paperback version is released). The
reviewer readily endorses the work for war college and graduate level
national security courses. He also concurs with the assessment of many
other defense professionals that Army of None represents a tour de force
concerning autonomous weapons, the moral implications stemming
from their use, and the combat potentials—and pitfalls—of utilizing
militarized AI itself.

Strategy, Evolution, and War: From
Apes to Artificial Intelligence
By Kenneth Payne
Reviewed by Dr. Richard M. Meinhart, professor of defense and joint processes,
Department of Command, Leadership, and Management, US Army War College

Washington, DC:
Georgetown University
Press, 2018
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S

trategy, Evolution, and War by Kenneth Payne deeply explores the
evolution of strategy in war from a human perspective while
considering how artificial intelligence (AI) may influence tactical and
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strategic perspectives of future strategy development. The book’s front
cover engages the reader’s mind in an inquisitive manner with the subtitle
From Apes to Artificial Intelligence and an image of an artificial person with
a weapon developed from a few hundred 0s and 1s. Key strategy insights
from a war perspective that integrate different theories, strategists, and a
variety of historical and current examples are well supported by almost
400 academic sources. The complexity associated with Payne’s many
insights requires careful reading and reflection to fully appreciate and
apply them.
In the introduction’s first two paragraphs, Payne succinctly identifies
the book’s focus and conclusion. He defines strategy as “the purposeful
use of violence for political ends.” Hence, the book’s focus is on war
versus other strategy-related endeavors. He then states “strategy is soon
to undergo something of a dramatic transformation because machines
will make important decisions about war and will do so without input
from human minds.” He summarizes the psychology of strategy, its
historical evolution from ancient Greece to nuclear weapons, and the
tactical and strategic influence of artificial intelligence that sets the stage
for the book’s eight chapters, which are organized in three key parts:
“The Evolution of Strategists,” “Culture Meets Evolved Strategy,” and
“Artificial Intelligence and Strategy.”
The first chapter, “Defining Strategy as Psychology,” provides
context for strategy’s overall psychological evolution from human and
cultural perspectives dating from classical Greek Thucydidan insights on
the Peloponnesian War to a more distinct strategy in Europe’s eighteenth
century with key examples associated with Carl von Clausewitz and the
Napoleonic Wars. Building on the psychology of strategy, the next chapter
delves deeper into the inseparability of strategic and human evolution.
Payne provides examples of how cognitive abilities and consciousness
have changed from chimps to humans, who organize into larger social
groups, and the strategy implications of warfare. The last chapter of part
1 examines how a leader’s strategy, which is ultimately a distinct choice,
can be greatly influenced by heuristics and biases. He discusses different
biases that can favor groups or actions, including risk assessment, that
can influence decision-making. Included in this cognitive discussion are
examples of the connectedness of emotions and consciousness when
making strategy decisions as well as ways to ameliorate heuristic errors.
Part 2 provides three chapters on the history of human culture and
war affecting the psychology of behavior and strategy based upon ancient
Greece and the Peloponnesian War, Carl von Clausewitz on warfare
and strategy associated with the Napoleonic Wars, and the influence of
nuclear weapons strategy. The discussion on ancient Greece illustrates
how writing and inquiry provided cultural and strategic insights on
the interaction of weapons, warriors, and society changing overtime.
The chapter on Clausewitz and the Napoleonic Wars explores how the
character of war changed to generate and employ force including fog
and friction as well as determining a center of gravity. While technology
and weaponry changed, key strategy insights included the intimate
connection between armed forces and society. The last chapter of part 2
provides examples of how nuclear weapons were profoundly disruptive
and influenced thinking on the use of force through examining the Cold
War in general and the Cuban missile crisis specifically. A key point
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Payne makes is that nuclear weapons influenced the rationality and
consciousness of strategy decisions due to the consequences of using
such weapons. But overall, he did not consider this psychologically
revolutionary for strategy.
While the book’s first two parts discuss strategy from psychological,
historical, and human perspectives that have been widely examined in
multiple academic venues, part 3 examines the potential AI will have
on strategy from both tactical and strategic perspectives. The chapter
entitled “Tactical Artificial Intelligence Arrives” focuses on battlefield
strategy using AI technology, algorisms, and computing power versus
human decisions on when and how to attack in multiple warfighting
domains. Key points Payne makes are that tactical AI lacks a sense
of meaning, AI decisions will be much quicker with an offensive
versus defensive focus, and AI tactical decisions can have strategic
consequences. He also identifies how AI technology may dramatically
shift the balance of military power between states and how humans
may be out of the decision loop, which undercuts a mission-command
philosophy. The “Artificial General Intelligence Does Strategy” chapter
is somewhat speculative regarding what-might-happen or what-couldhappen events. He identifies that AGI’s potential future development
and strategy implications should be considered even though “defining
AGI (artificial general intelligence) is no easy matter as the concept
is rather underspecified,” and there are differences between AGI and
human intelligence.
Strateg y, Evolution, and War insightfully examines strategy’s evolution
in warfare and potential for the future. The influence of nuclear weapons
on strategy in the recent past is very relevant to national security and
military professionals as nuclear capabilities and strategy are currently
being discussed in today’s national security environment. Similarly the
use and potential growth of AI can have far-reaching effects on future
warfare strategy decisions. In today’s evolving security environment,
these factors must be well understood by senior leaders to preclude blind
spots in decision-making relating to the future of AI across the many
levels and domains of warfighting.

Outsourcing War to Machines: The
Military Robotics Revolution
By Paul J. Springer
Reviewed by Robert J. Bunker, adjunct research professor, Strategic Studies
Institute, US Army War College

Santa Barbara, CA:
Praeger Security
International, 2018
259 pages
$63.00

T

he author of Outsourcing War to Machines, Dr. Paul J. Springer, is a
military historian and a professor at the Air Command and Staff
College, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. He also authored Military
Robots and Drones: A Reference Handbook and contributed to two more recent
works on cyberwarfare. His new effort refocuses his academic efforts on
robotic systems, including unmanned and primarily human teleoperated
equipment, that can be utilized for a variety of military missions. As
such, the work “provide[s] context to the rise and deployment of military
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robotics. It raises issues with the legality and morality of using these
advanced systems and critiques the ways in which they have been used
in recent conflicts” (3). The work is contemporary and US-focused
given our extensive use of intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
and armed drones in the Global War on Terror and the fact that we are
promoting most of the technological advancement in this area.
The book’s initial chapter lays out research design, breaks down
topics in each chapter, and offers background information related to
definitions, artificial intelligence (AI) and cognition, and war on terror
antecedents. The second chapter provides an overview to revolution in
military affairs (RMA) thinking and how military robots may be viewed
as representative of such a new revolution. The third chapter represents
a historical overview of robotics from the ancient past up to the point
that the decision was made to first weaponize a Predator drone in 2001.
Chapter 4 focuses on the dominant robots that have been deployed in
the Global War on Terror, which include the Reaper, multi-function
agile remote control robots (MARCbots), and PackBot systems. The
rise of mercenary forces and the lethal targeting of American citizens
overseas who have committed treason are also covered. The fifth
chapter highlights how military robots are viewed within the laws of
armed conflict, how their use may require changes in such laws, and
how technology is changing American use-of-force behaviors. Chapter
6 looks at armed robots vis-à-vis ethics in war, analyses the relationship
of these systems to concepts of proportionality, discrimination, and
military necessity and highlights the amoral nature of machines based
on programming logic. Chapter 7 provides a contemporary treatment
of cyberwarfare—this tangential topical focus will be addressed later in
the review. The final chapter provides what is acknowledged to be a light
treatment of military robotics futures.
The strengths of the work are that it is well written and logically
laid out by an expert in this subject matter. Further, I found the work to
be well researched and referenced. It is also priced reasonably well for a
hardcover academic text. Many of the discussions provided in the book
made for engaging reads such as the historical treatment of the subject.
A specific weakness with the work, however, exists with chapter
7, “The Global Competition.” The author principally focuses on
cyberwarfare related to Russia, China, Israel, and Iran instead of on
emerging armed robotics trends and considerations. This gives the
reviewer the impression that cyberwarfare filler was utilized, rather than
undertaking new research to flesh out that chapter. The relationship
between the emergence of military robotics to the phalanx, gunpowder,
and nuclear RMAs in chapter 2 could have also been analyzed more in
depth—especially at the force structure, strategic, and most importantly,
political organizational form level. The phalanx was an early product
of city-states while gunpowder-based weaponry was a manifestation of
dynastic states that later transitioned into nation-states. Nuclear weapons
represent a late nation-state military capability. This begs to question
what political organizational form military robots—most importantly
weaponized AI-based ones—may portend.
Overall, the work intentionally focuses more on the context and
history behind the military robotics revolution rather than attempting
to analyze or project where that revolution may be heading—an
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established scholar, Springer specifically points out the folly in making
such predictions (195). One of the concluding insights he offers is that
“an outright ban on military robotics is unlikely to have much of an
effect” (214). Further, outright slaughter will likely be required before
any meaningful international bans will be enacted. Related concerns are
made earlier concerning the dangers these systems represent—especially
in regard to militarized robotics and artificial intelligence—with the
2015 petition circulated against such new revolutionary weaponry (220).
In summation, Outsourcing War to Machines will likely continue to exist
in the shadow of Paul Scharre’s higher profile, more popularized, and
affordable work Army of None. Springer’s book, however, fulfills a much
needed contextual and historical grounding in this topic that the student
of war should undertake prior to reading more focused efforts on robotic
and autonomous systems on the contemporary and future battlefield.
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Military History
Harsh Lessons: Iraq, Afghanistan and
the Changing Character of War
By Ben Barry
Reviewed by Andrew Byers, co-founder, Counter Extremism Network

B

en Barry, OBE, a retired Brigadier and Senior Fellow for Land
Warfare at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, has set
out to draw lessons for future US and allied military operations, as well as
arguments about the changing character of war, from the conflicts in Iraq
and Afghanistan. Harsh Lessons is comprised of five substantive chapters
to analyze “the changing character of conflict in the wars in Iraq and
Afghanistan, with a view to identifying pointers to the future character
of conflict” (12). By “character of war,” Barry means the Clausewitzian
sense, “which encompasses the varying ways and means by which war is
fought” (11).
Barry argues the United States came close to strategic defeat in both
Iraq and Afghanistan—taking several years to realize that its ends, ways,
and means in both conflicts were insufficient for the task. It is from
US failures, as well as its successes, that Barry draws his lessons for the
future of war.
Chapter 1 provides brief histories of the two conflicts from 2001
through 2015, offering a good, if brief, overview of the two wars—
this chapter is not the definitive history of either conflict, nor does it
try to be. To Barry, these wars have validated the interdependence of
war and politics at the tactical level as well as the effectiveness of the
“clear, hold, build” approach in Afghanistan. He argues US defeat in
both wars was narrowly avoided by adding personnel surges to conduct
counterinsurgency campaigns though he acknowledges that security
deteriorated in both cases after responsibility was transferred to Baghdad
and Kabul. This outcome suggests a major disconnect in the viability of
long-term stability operations and the need for local partners able and
willing to provide effective security for civilian populations.
I am skeptical of one claim that Barry makes: the wars in Iraq and
Afghanistan have validated US counterinsurgency doctrine (34). This
claim seems especially spurious in the case of Afghanistan, a conflict
that drags on seventeen years (at the time of this writing) after it began.
Afghanistan is surely not a strongly positive case study in the efficacy of
US counterinsurgency operations.
Chapter 2 explores the formulation and execution of strategy in
both conflicts, command and control, and alliance/coalition command.
In the case of Iraq, Barry argues there were interlinked strategic failures:
failure to plan adequately for postconflict stabilization, failure to respond
to actual (rather than anticipated) conditions after successful regime
change, and failure to impose security rapidly in Baghdad, the country’s
political center of gravity. Barry also highlights the need for unity of
effort, which proved to be a significant problem in Afghanistan—only
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in 2010 were all US troops placed under a unified command. This
chapter does highlight one problem with the book: at times, there is too
much blurring of the two conflicts, with Iraq and Afghanistan treated as
a single pool of experiences and lessons to be learned without adequately
differentiating them.
Chapter 3 analyzes the military capabilities, tactics, and operations of
both sides in the two conflicts. The strength of this chapter is in Barry’s
identification of key areas in which a lack of understanding or expertise
proved especially deleterious—for example, lack of understanding of
cultural differences, such as the problems stemming from the use of
dogs inside Iraqi homes; poor intelligence at the tactical level; and a
lack of expertise in handling detainees, who could have been important
sources of intelligence if treated properly. Barry also points out the
limited use of lessons learned from one conflict to another.
Chapter 4 discusses the concept of military adaptation in Iraq and
Afghanistan and the need to rapidly change equipment, organization,
and methods during war. In both cases, this is largely a story in which
insurgents rapidly adapted while the United States and allies struggled to
adjust to the conflicts’ changing conditions and opponents’ actions and
capabilities (such as the use of improvised explosive devices).
Chapter 5 explores the utility of force, which allows Barry to
examine the conduct and character of contemporary warfare. Here he
emphasizes the complexity of war and the unpredictability of enemy
actions, providing further discussion of the strategic corporal concept.
Just as small unit leaders and actions taken at the tactical level can have
disproportionately great effects, they can also have vastly negative effects
on the overall war effort, as scandals like the abuse of prisoners at places
like Abu Ghraib demonstrated.
Barry’s conclusion provides a synthesis of his major arguments on
the nature of these wars and likely prospects for future conflicts. He
argues the United States deployed inadequate forces and overall effort
in building state capacity, after regime changes. In part, this was the
product of overconfidence, slowness to adapt to the changing character
of war, and too much attraction to the revolution in military affairs,
which offered little help in stabilization operations. One of Barry’s
conclusions deserves repeating: unless regime change is followed
by successful stabilization efforts and state institution-building, the
resulting conditions are likely to be no better and possibly worse than
prior to the campaign (141).
Harsh Lessons is recommended because of its valuable insights about
US and allied experiences in the two conflicts. Reading it sparks a great
many conversations about the course of these wars, and what they
may presage about the future of warfare. While we must be cautious
about “overlearning” the lessons of past conflicts—no future conflict
will unfold the way that either Iraq or Afghanistan did, and future
conflicts with near-peer adversaries will likely look nothing like these
campaigns—Barry’s effort here is a worthy one.

TOC

Book Reviews: Military History

85

Israel’s Long War with Hezbollah: Military
Innovation and Adaptation under Fire
By Raphael D. Marcus
Reviewed by Alma Keshavarz, associate, Small Wars Journal—El Centro

R

aphael D. Marcus examines the military history of the conflict
between Israel and Hezbollah since 1985. The first part of the
book assesses strategic adaptation with an emphasis on Israel’s
deterrence policy towards Hezbollah. The second examines operational
adaptation with a focus on what shaped the Israel Defense Forces’s
(IDF’s) planning and Hezbollah’s transformation. Marcus explains how
the IDF continuously adjusted its defense policy and its understanding
of Hezbollah with each conflict. The author examines key battles and
assesses the strategy from the perspectives of Israel and Hezbollah as well
as the development and application of the IDF operational warfighting
concept in Lebanon. Marcus leads the reader from the beginning of the
conflict, through the counterguerrilla campaign, to the Israeli withdrawal
from Lebanon, and throughout the war.
The first four chapters of the book provide Hezbollah’s background
as an unorganized militant group that spearheaded the use of suicide
bombings and relied heavily on kidnappings and terrorist attacks.
Early in its development, Hezbollah was trained by Iran’s Islamic
Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) in “explosive demolition, field
intelligence, reconnaissance, and other military skills” (44). Throughout
the first decade of Hezbollah’s existence, the group engaged in guerrilla
warfare, which the IDF fought conventionally. As the author notes, the
IDF “conceptually viewed Hezbollah as a routine security threat that
was easily dealt with in reactive, low intensity operations” (50). Following
the IDF’s assassination of Hezbollah’s leader, Abbas al-Musawi, in
1992, Hezbollah sought retribution. But high casualty rates during the
first decade of the conflict also encouraged the group to reevaluate
its technique and strategy towards the IDF. During the 1990s Hassan
Nasrallah, Hezbollah’s current secretary-general, came to the forefront
of Hezbollah’s strategic command. Under his leadership, the group
evolved from a “terrorist militia to a guerilla force to a commando force”
(72). In response, Israel developed the Egoz, which was designed as a
clandestine reconnaissance unit that became proficient in concealment
techniques, intelligence collection, and urban warfare. This new elite
unit was able to embed in southern Lebanon for long periods.
While Hezbollah continued to transform its strategy, the IDF was
slow to respond. This is a major theme within the book. Defense Minister
Moshe Arens finally adapted the IDF’s strategy in the late 1990s with a
policy of deterrence. But leveraging the Lebanese government against
Syria and Hezbollah was not enough. Domestic pressure led Prime
Minister Ehud Barak to unilaterally withdraw the IDF from Lebanon in
May 2000, which showed the major rift in civil-military affairs in Israel.
As Marcus notes, the IDF’s strategic mistake was “the mischaracterization
of the nature of the enemy and slow conceptual adaptation” (113).
Eventually the IDF changed course and, in 1999, paid greater attention
to the threat by acquiring new weapon systems, adjusting its defense
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budget, and addressing manpower issues. These changes equated to an
Israeli revolution in military affairs (RMA). The author references the
IDF perspective on successful US military operations at the onset of the
Afghanistan and Iraq Wars, which “validated the utility of the RMA and
associated precision technologies” (136). The second half of the book
delves deeper into this concept and the Second Lebanon War.
Throughout the course of the book, Marcus demonstrates
Hezbollah’s effort to take the lessons learned and adapt them to IDF
strategy. Although Hezbollah continued persistent rocket fire despite
being bombarded by the IDF in 1993 and 1996 conflicts, the author’s
focus on the 2006 campaign is most noteworthy. Marcus described the
IDF’s trajectory from the beginning of the conflict with Hezbollah and
explained how the force did not manage to respond accordingly. Israel
did not lose the war, but neither did Hezbollah; for Hezbollah, it is
“victory by not losing” (207). Air campaigns were not sufficient and the
authorization to use limited ground operations came later than it should
have. What made the fight more difficult for ground operations was that
some Hezbollah fighters were uniformed and others were not. It later
became apparent that Hezbollah fired rockets from civilian dwellings.
Survivability, Iranian assistance, and embedded fighters were some of
the challenges the IDF faced. Hezbollah’s operational approach blended
irregular and guerrilla elements and the IDF was not prepared to fight
this type of campaign.
Ultimately, Marcus adequately presents the military history of the
Israel-Hezbollah conflict. He features the processes of Israel’s political
echelons and military officials as well as Hezbollah’s leaders, and how
both sides adapted their strategies and warfighting techniques with each
conflict. Israel’s Long War explains the IDF’s difficulty with military
adaptation and conceptualizing the Hezbollah threat. While there are
a number of available works covering the long Israel-Hezbollah history,
Marcus’s work is in the minority that details the operational and strategic
aspects of both sides. The book is a significant contribution to the study
of this conflict and of Hezbollah. But it also serves as a case study on how
militaries—both state and nonstate—can learn from battlefield mistakes
and evolve to match threats. The afterword briefly discusses Hezbollah’s
continued transformation with Iranian and Russian assistance in Syria.
Hezbollah has endured losses since the Syrian Civil War started in 2011,
but it has also gained invaluable battlefield experiences against the Islamic
State and other groups countering Bashar al-Assad’s forces. This book
is worth the attention of anyone interested in learning the intricacies of
the civil-military dynamic and those who seek a deeper knowledge of the
military history surrounding the Israel-Hezbollah conflict.
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The 1st Infantry Division and the US Army Transformed:
Road to Victory in Desert Storm, 1970–1991
By Gregory Fontenot
Reviewed by Colonel Tarn Warren, former chair, Department of Military
Strategy, Planning and Operations, US Army War College

C

olonel Gregory Fontenot’s The 1st Infantry Division and the US Army
Transformed: Road to Victory in Desert Storm, 1970–1991 brings to life
the “Big Red One” by telling the story of a US infantry division, reborn
from the post-Vietnam malaise, forged into an effective fighting unit,
tested in fast-paced conventional combat, and emerging victorious. The
book provides a historical narrative that will interest a wide range of
readers, from young soldiers and leaders to national policymakers. Indeed,
the author exposes several lessons that should leave lasting impressions
on those who would contemplate warfare and those who would serve in
it. He also thickens the historiography of this topic and uses a wide range
of primary and secondary sources, that include hundreds of personal
interviews, to tell the story and make his points.
The book starts big, gains focus by plowing through incredible
tactical details, and ends big, again with valuable insights. Appropriately,
the author begins by providing some context. He adeptly describes the
post-Vietnam Army-wide challenges and their negative impact on such
elements as force development, training, logistics, and morale. The
1st Infantry Division (1st ID) was hit particularly hard because it was
not considered a high-priority unit. As a result of these problems, the
book describes how senior Army leadership in the 1970s and 1980s
implemented new concepts, doctrine, programs, and equipment such as
AirLand Battle, Return of Forces to Germany (REFORGER) exercises,
Field Manual 100-5, various weapon systems, and the National Training
Center to attempt positive transformation of the force and regain highend combat effectiveness. More specifically, the author relates how
two successive division commanders, General Gordon R. Sullivan and
Lieutenant General Thomas G. Rhame, made the most of few resources
to slowly improve, in fits and starts, the 1st Infantry Division’s combat
readiness up to the beginning of the Persian Gulf War in 1991. Fontenot
makes it clear they did much with little.
Leading up to the Gulf War, the narrative provides some needed
background on Saddam Hussein, Iraq’s war with Iran, and Iraq’s strategic
view at that time. Shifting to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990, the
US-led coalition responded and the Big Red One played a significant role.
Now the book dives deep and stays there among the division’s tactical
units until the end, popping up at brief intervals for some strategic air.
Fontenot places the reader in the midst of the 1st Infantry Division’s
battalions and brigades as they struggle to uncoil from Fort Riley, rail
to port, load ships, sail and fly to Saudi Arabia, unload, and move 500
kilometers to their assembly areas. A Herculean effort, to be sure, made
tougher by never having enough of anything. Throughout, the book
also commendably exposes how the fog of war and demands of combat
impact key-leader decisions, relationships, and command and control at
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all levels from US Central Command down through VII Corps to the
1st Infantry Division and its subordinate tactical units.
Readers are immersed in the intensive preparations for the attack
north and the great “left hook” to roll up the enemy’s right flank. With
precision and clarity, Fontenot weaves a narrative of leaders and soldiers
dealing with confusion, scarcity, surprise, culmination, euphoria,
and ultimately, victory—all buoyed by faith in purpose and mission
command. Importantly, the book is candid and balanced, exposing
failures and fratricide. The author does not cheerlead; instead, through
the words of those who were there, he reminds us that the preparation
for, and conduct of, large-scale combat operations is hard, really hard.
With an entire mechanized corps on the move, the author makes
a big desert small. The author devotes several riveting chapters to
the Big Red One’s initial breach and subsequent offensive operations,
moving the point of view from tank turrets, to resupply columns, to
higher operations centers, and to his own tank battalion. As the 100hour war unfolds, the story grips the reader with first enemy contacts,
lost fuel convoys, and navigating at night in a featureless desert without
global positioning systems, all in pursuit of the Iraqi Republican Guard.
After more than three straight days of combat, fatigue bites hard, and
with units stretched out over hundreds of miles, effective command
and control is severely strained, if not absent. Fontenot convincingly
describes the culmination of VII Corps and the 1st ID on February
28, now well inside Kuwait, due mainly to a lack of gas and sleep. The
story concludes with the Big Red One’s hasty and difficult transition
to improvised stability operations in Kuwait and the long road home,
ending back at Fort Riley.
The book concludes with some important points for Army leaders
at all levels. First, rigorous training pays off—eventually. The huge
investments in concepts, doctrine, equipment, and the National Training
Center helped foster success against the fourth largest army in the
world at the time. Second, good leadership is decisive amid the chaos of
combat, and the US belief in mission command and commanders’ intent
remains a key, if not unique, strength. Third, Fontenot vividly relates
how strained operational and tactical sustainment can be a greater threat
to success than enemy resistance. These lessons have particular relevance
today as the United States Army refocuses on near-peer competitors.
The main criticism of this book is that it could have been shorter and
delivered the same effect. The breadth and volume of tactical detail
was at times too scattered, somewhat affecting coherence. Nonetheless,
through dedicated research and gripping personal accounts, Fontenot
tells a worthy war story with timeless lessons for future conflict.
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Anatomy of a Campaign: The British Fiasco in Norway, 1940
By John Kiszley
Reviewed by Dr. James Corum, lecturer, Department of Politics and
Contemporary History, Salford University, United Kingdom

T

he campaign in Norway, which lasted from April to June 1940, is one
of the understudied campaigns of World War II. After all, Norway
never assumed the decisive importance that both the Germans and the
British thought it would have. After the German offensive in the west in
May 1940, it was seen as something of a sideshow. Yet the Norwegian
campaign highlights an incredible level of deficiencies in the British
wartime command and control system at the strategic, operational, and
tactical levels at the outset of the war. It was a campaign that the British,
French, and Norwegian forces might well have won if only they had
possessed a basic competence in joint operations and a command system
capable of effective and rapid planning and response. Unfortunately, the
Germans possessed an effective command system and understanding of
operational warfare in 1940 while the British did not.
Retired Lieutenant General John P. Kiszely, an officer with an
impressive background in command and higher staff positions, has
written about the 1940 campaign in Norway with a new perspective
that focuses on British leadership and command. Few historians would
have the insights into the personalities of high command that General
Kiszely has, simply because the author spent years in the senior staffs
in Whitehall and has a clear understanding of what commanders need
to know and do. Thus, his analysis, based on a careful reading of the
minutes of the staff conferences, is pretty damning in terms of the
performance of Britain’s military chiefs in April and May 1940.
In this thoroughly researched and documented study, General
Kiszely dissects the campaign and explains how the world’s top navy,
alongside a very capable air force and a less capable army, could fail
so badly. A British campaign that included poor planning, muddled
decision-making, failed coalition operations, and a lack of any operational
concept or interservice cooperation plagued the allies from the start.
The title describing the British fight in Norway as a “fiasco” is apt, and
in Kiszely’s analysis none of the major British strategic players—the
service chiefs, the military staffs, the war cabinet and First Lord of the
Admiralty Sir Winston Churchill—performed well.
Both the Germans and the British saw Norway as strategically
important, and the military staffs of both countries began planning
for major operations there in December 1939. The contrast in planning
is remarkable. The German navy, Luftwaffe, and army staffs worked
closely together, understanding this campaign would be the first
campaign in warfare in which all three services would play a major and
essential role. The German plan identified the forces to be allocated,
which included almost all the German navy’s surface fleet, a few recently
raised infantry divisions not needed for the upcoming spring offensive,
and a sizeable and well-balanced air component. German operational
planning anticipated some of the obvious requirements of the campaign.
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Widely separated task forces would require a lot of communications, and
the Germans built a considerable signals force into their initial landing
plan. A joint operation would require close interservice cooperation, and
the German staffs established an effective liaison and command system
under a theater headquarters. At the lower level, the German army
task forces ensured they had a good mix of supporting arms, especially
antiaircraft and engineers, in the first attack wave.
The contrast with the British approach to planning is striking. At
the lower levels, the British Army planning for deploying forces to
Norway were abysmal. Little thought was given to ensuring adequate
communications, liaison with the other services, or in ensuring adequate
antiaircraft cover. In short, pretty basic stuff was ignored. There was no
British theater headquarters or commander, and when the fight came,
the different British landing forces in central Norway and Narvik all
reported to different commanders in London.
On paper the British seemed prepared for joint warfare. Britain had
the Military Coordination Committee with some exceptionally capable
officers assigned to it. But at this stage of the war, the committee had no
real staff and limited powers, and its role had not been clearly defined.
The war cabinet providing strategic policy was too large to be effective.
Interservice rivalry was intense. Poor communications kept the military
chiefs in London in the dark about the conditions in Norway. The British
did not appoint a senior liaison officer to the Norwegian Army and
this considerable force, eager and ready to fight, was virtually ignored
in British operations. The British effort at the tactical level included
some successes in the fight for central Norway and in the Royal Navy’s
destruction of ten German destroyers at Narvik. But the confused
headquarters in London failed to exploit tactical success.
General Kiszely demonstrates how the personalities of the service
chiefs can have a decisive impact on a campaign. In the case of the British
service chiefs, all were seasoned professionals with good reputations,
but none were perfect, and all exhibited serious flaws in their command
style. Admiral of the Fleet, Sir Dudley Pound, was already worn out
and exhibited little interest in issues that did not directly involve his
service. Chief of the Air Staff Sir Cyril Newall was known as a talented
administrator, but had a weak understanding of doctrine and operations.
Like Pound, he declined to get involved in issues of joint operations.
Chief of the Imperial General Staff Sir Edmund Ironside had a superb
military record but had always served as a field commander, had never
served on the senior staff, and had no experience in strategic level
planning. The senior officers of each service well knew much better
candidates for these jobs were available.
The technology of war has greatly changed since 1940, but the
human aspects including the essentials of command, planning, and
coordination have not changed. This is why I highly recommend this
book as essential reading for all military officers and civilian leaders
to understand the dynamics of decision-making, operational planning,
and execution in modern conflict. As we have learned from some
recent conflicts, experienced and highly educated senior officers can get
campaign planning and execution horribly wrong. Sometimes we need
to highlight a campaign that offers some concentrated lessons on the
basics of senior leadership and organization.
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The Fighters: Americans in Combat in Afghanistan and Iraq
By C. J. Chivers
Reviewed by Russell W. Glenn, director, Plans and Policy, G2, US Army Training
and Doctrine Command

T

he Fighters provides an overview of US military operations in
Afghanistan and Iraq via the experiences of six American military
personnel—three from the Army (a helicopter pilot, member of the
special operations community, and infantry soldier), two from the Navy
(a corpsman and an aviator), and one Marine Corps officer (infantry
platoon leader)—with a total of more than seventeen years of combat
experience in those countries. Chivers, a former marine, repeatedly visited
the two theaters, meeting four of his subjects there and complementing
his reconstruction of the events with additional interviews in the United
States. Individuals contacted in these later instances include the subjects,
servicemembers from their units, and family members. The result is
combat related through the eyes of men and women who have seen the
elephant and others close to them, individuals who make known their
doubts regarding the conduct, purpose, and chances of success in the
two ongoing contingencies.
This is ever a view from the bottom up. The perspectives are
personal, the takes tactical. Readers will find little consideration of
concerns at the operational and strategic levels of war. Such a focus is
deliberate. Combined with the multiple standpoints through which we
view each combatant are moments wherein Chivers relates the same
event through very different lenses. For example, one member of a
trio is killed in a rocket attack as the men approach a PX trailer. His
companions reflect on the event as they recover from their own wounds,
one finding confirmation of his faith in survival, the other marveling
at the play of chance as dictator of whether one lives or dies, mends
or is forever crippled. The tactical perspective also offers validation of
the unfortunate truth that lessons learned are too often lessons later
forgotten.
Some readers will, at times, find themselves dissatisfied as The
Fighters’ prose slips into the subjective. That Chivers has little sympathy
for decision makers at higher echelons is immediately apparent in the
preface where he concludes the lives of Afghanistan and Iraq veterans
have been “harnessed to wars that ran far past the pursuit of justice”
and were “betrayed not by their neighbors, but by their leaders” (xxii–
xxiii). The naval aviator repeatedly expresses fear and remorse that his
strikes might have killed innocents; he is thankful when a sortie does not
require him to release munitions. Readers would have benefited from
deeper probing into why a leader so fearful of war’s play of friction and
chance chooses to return to theater on multiple tours.
Successfully mining the ore of human emotions during combat
is a task often undertaken but rarely accomplished. Many of the elite
works, perhaps most, are firsthand accounts. E. B. Sledge’s With the Old
Breed does so with gripping and gritty recollections from World War II
foxholes in the Pacific as We Were Soldiers Once . . . and Young, coauthored
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Breed does so with gripping and gritty recollections from World War II
foxholes in the Pacific as We Were Soldiers Once . . . and Young, coauthored
by journalist Joe Galloway and then Lieutenant Colonel Hal Moore, does
primarily from LZ X-ray in the la Drang Valley of Vietnam. Clinton
Romesha’s Red Platoon more recently antes up with its gut-wrenching
recall of fighting at Combat Outpost Keating in Afghanistan. Students
of leadership still await a post-Second World War equivalent of Defeat
into Victory, Field-Marshal Viscount Slim’s masterful blend of tactical,
operational, and command considerations in recounting the campaign
that ousted the Japanese from WWII India.
The task is harder yet when the telling is not from a first-person
combatant’s pen. Recent accomplishments that hurdle this obstacle
include Mark Bowden’s Black Hawk Down, David Zucchino’s Thunder
Run narration regarding the first days of US forces in 2003 Baghdad,
and the likewise exceptional yet little known, Dead Men Risen regarding
the British Army’s Welsh Guards in Afghanistan by Toby Harnden.
Other offerings can add to our understanding, if less so. They might
accomplish this end via an occasional unique observation that provides
insights regarding the ever-evolving being that is the combat soldier.
These remind leaders of the view from the sharp end of the spear,
that of the combatants who benefit from or suffer the consequences
of decisions made at higher echelons. It is an invaluable perspective
however maintained.
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Irregular Warfare
Boko Haram: The History of an African Jihadist Movement
By Alexander Thurston
Reviewed by Dr. W. Andrew Terrill, professor emeritus, US Army War College

A

lexander Thurston has written an excellent study on the
development, evolution, rise, and decline of the African terrorist
group Boko Haram, which operates in Nigeria with some spillover into
Chad, Niger, and Cameroon. The group’s name is based on the Hausa
word Boko meaning Western education (and implying culture) and the
Arabic word Haram referring to things that are forbidden by Islam. Over
time, the group, which was always radical, became increasingly violent
and eventually inured itself to the deaths of Muslim bystanders to its
actions. It also unsuccessfully attempted to join al-Qaeda but later was
able to affiliate with the Islamic State at a nominal level. Thurston’s study
addresses numerous factors contributing to the rise of Boko Haram and
its turn to violence in 2009 as well as its later expansion and setbacks.
The author notes that Boko Haram originated with radical Salafi
preacher Mohammed Yusuf who operated from the city of Maiduguri
in northern Nigeria. As the leader of Boko Haram, Yusuf preached a
doctrine of religious exclusivism and railed against democracy (which
he said was used to replace the rule of God), secular laws, Christians,
and Muslim minorities such as Shiites and Sufis. He presented his fiery
sermons to audiences of ordinary people in northern Nigeria’s vernacular
languages, establishing a populous niche that helped him advance his
own status and agenda.
In the early 2000s, the government considered Yusuf to be a minor
nuisance and did not seriously oppose him. Yet, his movement was
growing, and his sermons often addressed topics of concern to some
Muslims. Yusuf’s criticisms of Nigerian government corruption seemed
honest, and many parents were also afraid that Western-style schools
would lead their children to become Christians or atheists.
When oil revenues fell in the early 1980s, the governmental program
for universal primary education collapsed leaving many young people
unable to obtain either a Western or Islamic education. Under these
circumstances, a number of young men entered into criminal gangs,
substantially increasing violence in northern cities and shantytowns,
making life there almost intolerable. Moreover, by the mid-1980s, some
Nigerian Muslims believed their country had failed at all major secular
forms of government: parliamentary, presidential, and military, as well
as capitalism and small amounts of socialism. Islamic government may
have seemed like a way to roll back kleptocracy and nepotism and to
reestablish some level of order.
As the northern crisis deepened, Nigerian leaders became
increasingly concerned about Boko Haram and eventually moved
against it within the larger context of an antibandit campaign. The
campaign during 2009 was authentic, but it was also used as cover to
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strike the organization, with several battles paralyzing Maiduguri before
the government defeated the radicals. In this struggle, hundreds of Boko
Haram members were killed, and Yusuf was captured and killed in what
was almost certainly an extrajudicial murder. After these events, the
Nigerian leadership believed that the danger had passed. But it had
not. The new Boko Haram leader, Abubakar Shekau, was determined
to rebuild in a way that radically expanded the use of violence. Under
his leadership, the organization evolved from the broken fragments of
a mass preaching movement into an exceptionally brutal terrorist and
guerrilla-warfare organization.
Correspondingly, Boko Haram prioritized efforts to obtain militarygrade weapons and learn how to manufacture bombs. It also had
considerable success in attacking prisons, freeing at least hundreds of
incarcerated members to replenish the organization’s ranks. By 2013, the
organization sought territorial conquest and displayed a willingness to
confront Nigerian forces in open battles. In late 2014, Shekau declared
that territory under Boko Haram’s control was no longer part of Nigeria.
Rather, it was a new territory defined by devotion to true Islam.
As the struggle developed, Boko Haram also faced a number
of problems in part due to its extensive and often arbitrary brutality
and murder. Concurrent with his many successful efforts to rebuild
the organization, Shekau also adopted broad and savage criteria for
declaring other Muslims to be unbelievers who had to be killed. Such
actions provoked fear and backlash among the northern population and
became a problem for Boko Haram when the government created an
official vigilante force to assist military units and provide them with local
intelligence. Further complicating the situation, in late 2011 breakaway
members of Boko Haram formed a less murderous splinter group.
Disaffected senior members would later accuse Shekau of killing
civilians on a whim or for his personal benefit. The most infamous of
the Boko Haram attacks, the kidnapping of 276 Chibok school girls in
mid-April 2014, led to increased Western military aid to the Nigerian
government for its struggle to destroy the organization. In early 2015,
the Nigerian president, under severe domestic and foreign pressure,
initiated an offensive to destroy Boko Haram that also involved the
militaries of Chad, Niger, and some foreign mercenaries. In December
2015, the Nigerian president announced the defeat of the group, which
had lost most of its territory, but clearly continued to exist.
In considering this struggle, Thurston also discusses Boko Haram’s
ties with radical groups such as al-Qaeda and its affiliates and the
Islamic State. He acknowledges information on such ties is limited,
and his conclusions have to be tentative. According to Thurston, Boko
Haram seems to have maintained only limited contact with al-Qaeda
in Pakistan and Afghanistan. But the group sought to improve these
ties to obtain weapons, money, and training. They further sought to
reach out to al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), one of the
core organization’s most important affiliates. AQIM may have initially
provided limited support, but Shekau appears to have undermined his
case for further aid by ordering the murder of several Nigerian jihadists
within Boko Haram, whom AQIM knew and respected. Al-Qaeda
central appears to have decided against any agreement with Shekau as
he increasingly appeared headstrong, erratic, and willing to engage in
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gratuitous violence against even very conservative Muslims. Thurston
also doubts that the Islamic State provided much support to Boko
Haram even after it declared loyalty to the Caliphate in March 2015. At
that point, Islamic State leaders might have viewed Nigeria as a marginal
sideshow, although this situation may yet change.
Thurston doubts the Nigerian government will permanently defeat
Boko Haram or its descendants as long as poverty, unemployment,
and corruption dominate northern Nigeria. He also states that harsh
Nigerian military tactics can harm civilians and inadvertently strengthen
Boko Haram. Unfortunately, his search for alternatives does not come
up with much. He likes the concept of a deradicalization program, but
such efforts have often failed outside of Saudi Arabia, where they are
exceptionally well funded in ways that few other countries can duplicate.
Nevertheless, Thurston is clearly correct that efforts to destroy Boko
Haram will need a political as well as a military component and that
the government needs to make a strong effort to win the loyalty of all
its northern citizens. Finally, a central lesson of this study is that Boko
Haram rose from the ashes once in its history and could do so again as
the result of Nigerian and world complacency.

Congo’s Violent Peace: Conflict and Struggle
Since the Great African War
By Kris Berwouts
Reviewed by Diane Chido, author of Intelligence Sharing on Transnational
Organized Crime in Peace Keeping Environments

T

he Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) strives to prove the
central theme of George Friedman’s book, Flashpoints: the most
dangerous thing in the world to be is rich and weak. With nearly 20 years
of experience working and living in the country for which he expresses
great love and despair, author Kris Berwouts endeavors to overcome the
casual observer’s tendency to miss the region’s complexity and nuance
and to dismiss the frequent and intense violence as “senseless savagery.”
He provides a cogent analysis of the three root causes of conflict as the
dismemberment of the Congolese state, the extension of the Rwandan
conflict, and the illicit exploitation of Congo’s natural resources.
The key takeaway of this book is an appreciation of Congo as a
nation of extremes. It is the largest country in sub-Saharan Africa. It has
the greatest variety and amount of natural resources. It has borne the
deadliest series of conflicts since World War II. And, its 2006 election
was so heavily supported by the European Union that it has been called
the most expensive poll in history. The dizzying array of violent armed
groups, which Berwouts terms “social bandits” exacerbating violent
conflict in Congo, caused this analyst to long for a social network map,
but the acronym list provided a critical reference.
For a brief historical recap, King Afonso I ascended the Congolese
throne in 1506, soon after the first Portuguese settlers arrived, and
reigned for the next 40 years as the slave trade gained momentum and
utterly transformed the region. Afonso sent many letters to King John
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III in Lisbon imploring him to only send priests and teachers to Congo
and not the traders with their Western wares for which “a monstrous
greed” had adversely affected his subjects.
Foreshadowing modern Western involvement that would have little
regard for what the Congolese want or need, the slave trade continued
and with the reign of Belgian King Leopold II from 1865, conditions
for the population of Congo only became increasingly worse. Although
Western interest in exploiting Congo has not waned and should not be
excused, regional and domestic corruption and avarice are the more
immediate causes maintaining this “violent peace.”
Mobutu Sese Seko’s harsh autocratic 32-year rule continued the
enslavement of the population and provided very little healthcare,
education, or economic opportunity, much less political freedom under
the one-party system. Deep entanglements with neighboring Rwanda
also prevent peaceful development, as does the unfortunate role of
the Congolese defense forces as more of a problem than a solution to
Congo’s many ills.
Berwouts argues the end of the Cold War and Mobutu’s departure
in 1997 caused Congo’s current disarray and frequent violence as societal
institutions and networks were dismantled in a rush to democratization,
as in contemporaneous Yugoslavia, while the autocratic rule at the top
lost its patrons and was no longer able to suppress the fires of nationalist
secession. Although the overt genocide in Rwanda during 1994 appeared
to be managed, the struggle between Hutus and Tutsis has continued
with Congo as a new battlefield.
While Mobutu was deathly ill, Rwanda and Uganda supported
Laurent Desire Kabila as the only warlord who, while enriching himself
in Tanzania, had not been a Mobutu crony. The first phase of their
great African war fought on Congolese territory installed Kabila as
president about 10 days after Mobutu had left the country for medical
treatment. By July 1998, Kabila was viewed as Rwanda and Uganda’s
puppet, so he ousted Rwandan officials to save his domestic reputation.
These former allies returned with their armies in an effort to replace
him. The Southern African Development Community (SADC) sent a
multinational contingent to restore stability, but the war still resulted in
massive displacement and the creation of huge and vulnerable refugee
camps that remain targets for political wrangling and violence. Thus
delivered, Kabila presided over the fractious DRC until his assassination
in 2001. He was then succeeded by his son, Joseph, who has held
power since.
Berwouts painstakingly describes the various players and their
wrangling, with elections and a fragile peace process as a backdrop,
emphasizing that the cause of the continuing violence was not the great
African war but rather the ready availability of exploitable resources that
enable all of the elite and armed factions involved to continue to fund
themselves and their personal battles for territory and power. Their
nationalism is a thin veneer as they form alliances of convenience across
ethnic lines, thus reducing the population to the status of pawns.
The failure of colonial Europeans to understand the natural fluidity
of identity led to the creation of national and subnational borders
that were assumed to be related to the populations that lived in given
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locations, but for the populations, ethnicity was not a binary concept.
The new maps and their enforcement created territorial enclaves
that solidified identity, and thus today’s identity-based politics. These
associations were exacerbated by the Belgians importing labor, creating
a sense of nativism versus foreigner, even within the same ethnic group.
With democracy and land ownership came new a concept that
the size of a constituency mattered for elections, so implementing
exclusionary rules for determining who is a citizen with voting and
landowning rights coupled with targeted violence made perfect sense.
Such outcomes resulted in communities and individuals with economic
interests who perceived a need to form armed militias. Thus, it is clear
that the savagery is by no means senseless.
Berwouts concludes that the international community continues
to “benevolently” impose new peace and stability efforts on DRC and
the region as a whole that ignore local realities. A lack of political will
within the domestic arena, along with the failure of the international
community to hold DRC to recommended security sector reforms, as
well as police and military leaders who see their territories as personal
piggybanks, have led to a continued vortex of violence and exploitation.
Berwouts describes the use of rape as a calculated weapon of war
that has three decisive effects. First, women are used as a spoil of war
to define the victor. Then in the spirit of genocide, as a direct attack on
the reproductive capacity of the target group. And finally, just when it
seems the conflict is over, security forces, and even local members of
a community, engage in such acts with impunity, thus solidifying the
poison of conflict in the population’s culture.
With greed, a lack of legitimacy and governance, and stalled security
sector reform, Congo has been exploited since its “discovery” without
pause for its valuable resources, including its people. In fact, Berwouts
posits “kleptocracy” was coined to describe Congo, leaving the reader
with a feeling of dread for the country’s future.

Militarised Responses to Transnational
Organised Crime: The War on Crime
Edited by Tuesday Reitano, Lucia Bird Ruiz-Benitez de Lugo, and
Sasha Jesperson
Reviewed by Robert J. Bunker, adjunct research professor, Strategic Studies
Institute, US Army

M

ilitarised Responses to Transnational Organised Crime is drawn from
a series of conference papers—delivered at expert seminars in
London in November 2015 and in Geneva in February 2016 by sixteen
contributors—along with introductory and concluding contextual essays
penned by two of the editors. British and European scholarly thinking
and perceptions primarily influence the work that has direct linkages
to the Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime based
in Geneva and the Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies
based in London.
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The book focuses on militarized responses to organized criminal
actors engaging in four forms of illicit activity: wildlife crime, piracy,
smuggling of migrants, and drug trafficking. It concerns the decades
old “blurred crime and war” operational environment—both these
activities and the responses to them are covered within. A key statement
found in the introduction related to militarized response to transnational
organized crime (TOC) is as follows:
Militarised approaches are at one end of a spectrum that extends to
people-centred development approaches. In light of the discussions around
comprehensive approaches, responses to organised crime should sit near the
centre of this spectrum. They should constitute a mix of security responses
that combine intelligence, law enforcement, and the direct pursuit of criminals with development strategies that engage with the factors that make a
country vulnerable to organised crime. (3)

Unfortunately the “spectrum” insight is not further developed
within the work—nor is a more in-depth treatment of the proposed
integrated response later advocated in the concluding chapter (346–47).
Conceptually, the term “ungoverned” as opposed to “alternatively
governed” spaces is utilized for a sectional header, which represents a
missed nuance (5). Nature abhors a vacuum, and when the state was
never present in an area or has since been forced to retreat, criminal
actors actively fill the void with their own form of street governance.
We also get a sense of the sizes and monetary values of some of the
economies related to the different illicit activities focused upon, but this
was never made fully clear within the book. The intractability of these
illicit activities is summed up at the end of the work: “The conclusion
therefore is for the urgent need to build awareness and capacity in
policymakers to view organised crime as a nuanced threat—one that
often has deep socio-economic roots and few easy solutions” (348).
This, however, then takes us down the path of requiring a
“multidimensional harm reduction narrative” and monitoring “the
evolution of war talk” to help mitigate the propensity for militarized
response (348). What results is a catch-22 situation regarding
development—formal economy creation is desperately needed to
address underlying socio-economic conditions in areas where organized
crime is taking root, but development is not taking or simply cannot
take place. In a globalized economy where multinational corporations
and sovereign wealth funds are constantly shifting assets to achieve the
highest annualized returns—and at times either indirectly or directly
profit from the illicit economy—investing in development for its own
sake is a minor consideration. As a result, with organized crime either
outgunning or co-opting the policing and law enforcing institutions
of beleaguered states, the only remaining viable responses to such
activity are either military (institutional) or vigilante (armed citizen) or
mercenary (paid corporate contractor).
The work itself is composed of two introductory essays, four thematic
illicit activity sections (wildlife crime, piracy, migrant smuggling, and
drug trafficking) each comprised of four essays, a conclusion, and an
index. Endnotes and the authors biographies are provided at the back of
each of the nineteen essays found within the book. A number of figures
also exist within the well-referenced work. Of the four thematic essay
clusters, the reviewer found wildlife crime to be the most interesting
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followed by piracy, migrant smuggling, and then drug trafficking—
though this may well be due to his in depth knowledge related to the
latter. A most illustrative essay, by Julian Rademeyer, on rhino poaching
in South Africa’s Kruger National Park provides an overview of what
has become an increasingly militarized and unwinnable conflict between
park rangers and gangs of armed poachers (43–59). That these poachers
should be celebrated by locals in songs and considered victimized when
killed—as opposed to the dwindling herds of rhinos preyed upon or the
rangers defending them—adds a surreal nature to these criminal acts.
A minor difficulty with the work is that the individual essays are
drawn from two expert seminars then grouped together in thematic
clusters. This creates a bit of uneven coverage of the topical areas of
emphasis as well as generates some noticeable differences in the quality
of the contributions themselves. Another more pressing issue with the
work is its steep cost. This suggests that it will be accessed primarily
through university libraries or interlibrary loan, which will greatly limit
its impact.
A final assessment of Militarised Responses to Transnational Organised
Crime is that it only has marginal utility for the majority of senior defense
community members. Unless such a community member has a specific
need to address militarized responses to TOC (either generally or related
to a specific form of illicit activity), the work is too specialized a read.
Further, the overall gestalt of the work, which is more military response
debate, focused essentially long on what is wrong with such responses
but offered little on what to do about them (3). Thus, interest will be
higher among academic readers. Given the volume is meant to fill an
analytical and research gap in this area of policy studies, it should be
considered more an exploratory effort than a more mature study for
defense community application.
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Security Studies
The Angel: The Egyptian Spy Who Saved Israel
By Uri Bar-Joseph
Reviewed by Dr. W. Andrew Terrill, professor emeritus, US Army War College

T
New York: Harper, 2016
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he Angel is an interesting and important examination of one of
Israel’s most successful espionage efforts. This operation began
in 1970 and involved the penetration of the highest level of Egyptian
political and military decision-making by a spy within Egypt’s political
elite. The author of this study, Uri Bar-Joseph, is an Israeli scholar with
a background as a military intelligence officer and access to a variety of
declassified Israeli military files. Bar-Joseph identifies Ashraf Marwan
as Egypt’s most important traitor as well as the most valuable spy in
Israeli history. Marwan was the son-in-law of Egypt’s President Gamal
Abdul Nasser, and became a key advisor to President Anwar Sadat after
Nasser’s death. Perhaps surprisingly, Marwan played only a marginal
role in the Nasser government since his father-in-law disliked him and
thought he had married his daughter, Mona, as a career move. Nasser also
obtained evidence that Marwan had received money through personal
corruption and then angrily pressured Mona to divorce her husband.
Mona steadfastly refused to do so, and Nasser grudgingly allowed his
son-in-law to continue work as a minor official in the president’s office
under the supervision of Sami Sharaf, Nasser’s despotic chief of staff.
Unsurprisingly, Marwan was miserable in his job, which (along with
his wife’s salary) allowed him only a frugal middle-class lifestyle, far
less than what he had expected at the time of his marriage. He probably
hated Nasser, who continued to view him with contempt, and he also did
not enjoy enforced private austerity. Thus, for whatever mix of reasons,
in the summer of 1970, Marwan chose to contact Israeli intelligence
operatives via the embassy in London, England, where he occasionally
traveled and volunteered for service as a paid Mossad spy. All intelligence
agencies are suspicious of such “walk-ins,” but the Israelis were also
intrigued. Although Marwan was not an important decision maker
within Nasser’s staff, he did have access to important documents, and
quickly demonstrated his ability to obtain valuable information, which
seemed genuine and could be at least partially validated by other sources.
Mossad gave Marwan the codename of “The Angel” which referred to
the 1960s television series, The Saint, broadcast in Israel as The Angel.
Nasser’s September 1970 death gave Marwan an opportunity for
advancement within the Egyptian hierarchy, but only if he could find
a patron who viewed him as useful and perhaps was not so puritanical
about corruption. He placed his hopes on President Anwar Sadat,
Nasser’s vice president and successor, who was widely viewed as a
caretaker who would quickly be brushed aside by powerful opponents.
Moreover, Sadat, unlike his rivals, did not have a network of loyalists
and had to take his help where he could get it. Threatened with ouster,
Sadat made his move in May 1971 when he undertook what he called
the “Corrective Revolution” and removed his most powerful enemies
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from positions of power. Bar-Joseph maintains that all sources on this
power struggle agree that Marwan “played a central role in helping Sadat
overcome his opponents and establish his rule over Egypt” apparently
by providing the president with incriminating documents about his
rivals (88). These assessments of Marwan’s actions in the crisis appear
to have been borne out by his rapid and dramatic promotion to the
important posts of presidential secretary and Sadat’s personal emissary
to Libya and Saudi Arabia. Without Nasser’s restraint, Marwan again
began enriching himself through graft, while maintaining his lucrative
financial sideline of selling secrets to Israel.
The most pressing question for Israeli intelligence at this time was
under what conditions would Egypt consider itself ready to attack Israel,
even if only for limited war aims in Sinai. According to Bar-Joseph,
Marwan provided important and detailed documents indicating how
Egyptian forces planned to cross the Suez Canal. This information
on Egyptian strategic thinking helped provide the framework for
“the Concept,” an overarching paradigm that guided Israeli strategic
planning and military decision-making from late 1970 until October
1973. The Concept dictated that the Egyptians would not attack into
the Sinai Peninsula without first developing a way of compensating
for Israeli air superiority other than surface-to-air missiles on the west
bank of the Suez Canal (many of which were at fixed sites). Additionally,
according to the Concept, Sadat would fear attacking Israeli forces under
any circumstances without a deterrent force to threaten Israeli cities and
thereby prevent a process of escalation that might include bombing
of Egyptian targets throughout the country. Such sites could not be
protected by the Egyptian Air Force. Bar-Joseph bluntly maintains that
Israeli military intelligence was then under the command of a group of
officers whose commitment to the Concept was “unwavering, almost
religious” (189).
In early 1973, Marwan reported that Egypt was becoming
increasingly interested in a limited war to challenge a status quo that its
leaders viewed as intolerable. Sadat had by then made some progress in
obtaining appropriate aircraft and Scud missiles able to provide some
sort of minimal deterrent against Israeli strikes on Egypt’s urban areas.
In this environment, Marwan became a key source of information
about Egyptian changes in strategic thinking and the development of a
workable plan for attacking Israeli forces. Unfortunately for them, many
Israeli military leaders refused to abandon or even modify the Concept,
which was by now deeply rooted in their strategic outlook.
Additionally, Sadat closely protected the exact date of the attack, and
Marwan found out only by accident one day before the initial Egyptian
and Syrian strikes. He passed this information on to his Israeli contacts,
although some key military intelligence officials doubted the warnings.
Under these circumstances, Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir made
the hard choice of overruling her defense minister and fully mobilized
Israeli reserve forces. Bar-Joseph maintains that this action prevented
an even larger Israeli defeat than occurred in the first week of the war,
before Israel was able to turn the situation around.
After the war, Marwan’s relationship with Sadat cooled, and he was
dismissed from his role in the president’s office in March 1976 in order
to lead an industrial consortium. Marwan’s power within the Egyptian
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leadership then ended when Sadat was assassinated in 1981 and Vice
President Hosni Mubarak (whom Marwan disliked) took power.
Correspondingly, Marwan moved to London in 1981 where he sought
to make money, making good use of his contacts throughout the Arab
world and continuing to provide what information he could to Mossad.
At this time, Marwan faced some serious problems as information
started to leak about his activities with Mossad. Bar-Joseph accuses a
former head of Israeli military intelligence of leaking this information
on the basis of his belief that Marwan was a double agent, a charge he
dismisses as “baseless fantasy” (228).
As sometimes happens with spies, in June 2007, Marwan died a
mysterious death when he jumped, or was pushed, from the balcony of
his London apartment. Bar-Joseph believes he was killed by Egyptian
intelligence, although Marwan’s widow, Mona, later told the Observer that
Mossad had killed him for being a double agent for Egypt. Bar-Joseph
strongly maintains that Mossad leaders saw his death as a disaster since
they now looked incapable of protecting their spies, something that
could seriously undermine future recruitment.
Bar-Joseph’s book is well researched and well reasoned, but early
books on complex and multidimensional intelligence operations
using authoritative but incomplete sources can often be unreliable.
Bar-Joseph is aware of this shortcoming and expresses his hope that
this work survives the test of time. While some formerly classified
Israeli information on this matter has been released, Mossad files on
Marwan remain closed, and the organization has little incentive to
release them in the foreseeable future. Bar-Joseph has therefore written
the most complete and authoritative book that can be expected under
contemporary circumstances, but there may be many plot twists to this
story that remain unknown, at least for now.
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hose interested in building partner militaries should be delighted
to find that Mara E. Karlin’s book is extremely well written and
very well organized. A reader can easily navigate through the chapters
and the concepts. Those who have read a fair share of national security
policy-oriented books will appreciate the author’s writing style and clear
language, which make the book a relatively easy read.
In focusing on internal rather than external threats, Karlin
magnifies the focus against the popular idea within the national security
community that more is always the answer. As someone who deployed
to Iraq in 2007 as part of the Military Transition Teams, I understood
and appreciated the more nuanced argument: “To effectively strengthen
partner militaries in fragile states, the US military must transform its
engagement with them” (2).
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Karlin’s case study selections are excellent. Though her choice of
Vietnam as an example of failure was a little obvious, she did a very
good job of staying on her point and avoiding the likely pitfalls. While
the choice of Greece as an example of successful buildup of partner
militaries is interesting, the dichotomy of the two Lebanese cases makes
this book unique. In the first case, Karlin makes a solid argument
that US support for the Lebanese military partially failed due to the
involvement of regional actors. The second case, however, truly displays
the complications of building partner militaries when she discusses
how the Lebanese both criticized US assistance although the Lebanese
officials and also failed to take full advantage of that assistance. A perfect
example was the number of Lebanese officials that declared they were
more pleased with American training than equipment, while placing an
officer recently trained in counterterrorism in charge of the gym at the
Beirut officers’ club.
The critiques of Building Militaries in Fragile States involve the
definitions, charts, graphs, and the Vietnamese case study. The
definitions avoid taking a strong stance, which makes the book read
more like a history than a social science-based policy book. Whether
referring to military assistance, security force assistance, or something
else entirely, Karlin is in a unique position to enlighten her readers
about her definitions of concepts, and even how those definitions
evolved during her career in academe and policy. The charts and graphs
seemed to be more of a distraction than a visual enhancement for the
argument. More than likely, these unnecessary illustrations were added
at the behest of senior academics.
Lastly, the Vietnamese case study was problematic. Though the
conclusions are understandable and correct, the manner in which Karlin
comes to them will likely concern people far more knowledgeable of
Vietnam than me. Karlin operates on the theory that the failures in
Vietnam of the Military Assistance Advisory Groups and the Army of
the Republic of Vietnam were due primarily to the lack of focus on
internal security and the toxic leadership of Lieutenant General Samuel
T. Williams. Appreciating that this study focused on the military, there
can be no denying that government corruption of the Republic of
Vietnam was a major factor in losing hearts and minds. From the aspect
that the failure of Vietnam was due to Williams’s specific personality,
there was little mention of either President Diem Ngo Dinh or Major
General Edward G. Lansdale, both of whom could have easily had the
failure of Vietnam laid at their feet.
In summary, Building Militaries in Fragile States is an excellent policy
book trying to wrestle with a problem that has confounded the United
States for many, many years. Karlin speaks from a unique academic
and policy background, making a case that few can. She neither tries to
cheapen her argument with easy fixes or silly analogies but charges all
academic, government, and military professionals to continue searching
for answers. Her main point emphasizing how is one that policymakers
should, and hopefully will, be more considerate of. For those interested
in becoming acquainted with the topic or those trying to consider
different solutions to age-old problems, I highly recommend this book
both for its content and readability.
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